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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Wolfe was originally convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial 
and was sentenced to fixed life in 1982. However, many years later, Mr. Wolfe 
discovered that his alleged offense occurred on tribal grounds and that the alleged 
victim 1 was an "lndian"2 , thus depriving the Idaho courts of subject matter jurisdiction to 
bring the specific criminal charge in this case or to obtain a criminal conviction against 
him. Although he tried many times, and through numerous avenues, to obtain a hearing 
on the merits of his claim that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in his 
case, Mr. Wolfe has never had the actual substance of his claims adjudicated by any 
court. 
This case comes before this Court upon the denial of Mr. Wolfe's motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
to correct an illegal sentence, and upon the court's subsequent denial of Mr. Wolfe's 
successive Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence. The district court did not 
consider the merits of Mr. Wolfe's motion to reconsider the denial of his initial Rule 35 
motion under the erroneous belief that the merits of Mr. Wolfe's jurisdictional claim had 
previously been addressed in prior post-conviction proceedings. The district court did 
not consider the merits of Mr. Wolfe's second Rule 35 motion based upon the erroneous 
1 Given that some of the evidence in this case involves private information regarding the 
alleged victim that has been submitted to the Idaho Supreme Court under seal, 
Mr. Wolfe will not herein refer to the alleged victim by name. 
2 Mr. Wolfe acknowledges that the term "Indian," when used in reference to persons of 
Native American ancestry, has garnered some disfavor in modern usage. However, this 
term is used within this brief because it appears to be a legal term of art with regard to 
determinations of subject matter jurisdiction for criminal offenses occurring on tribal 
lands, or "Indian country," that involve members of recognized Native American tribes. 
Wolfe intends no disrespect through his use of this term. 
1 
conclusion that a defendant cannot file more than one Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal 
sentence. In both instances, the district court erred in its denial of Mr. Wolfe's motions. 
A proper review of Mr. Wolfe's motions, including the record of the post-
conviction proceedings relied upon by the trial court in finding that res judicata principles 
barred further review, demonstrates that the district court in Mr. Wolfe's original criminal 
proceedings lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the criminal proceedings in 
this case. Accordingly, Mr. Wolfe asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence. In the alternative, Mr. Wolfe asks that this Court remand his case to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 motions regarding the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
William Wolfe's long, and unsuccessful, series of attempts at obtaining a hearing 
on his claim that the State district court in Idaho lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the underlying criminal proceedings in his case began in 2004, when Mr. Wolfe filed an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence. In December 2004, 
Mr. Wolfe filed a pro se motion alleging an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35 based 
upon the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. {R., pp.31-32.) In his motion, Mr. Wolfe 
asserted that he had received an illegal sentence because exclusive jurisdiction for his 
alleged offense was vested exclusively in the federal courts. (R., p.32.) He further filed 
a memorandum in support of this motion that noted that the district court may correct an 
illegal sentence at any time. (R., p.37.) 
Thereafter, but before the district court ruled on the merits of Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 
motion, Mr. Wolfe also filed a successive petition seeking post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp.3-8.) Mr. Wolfe had been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced by the 
2 
Idaho County district court on August 5, 1982. {R., p.3.) In his pro se successive 
petition, Mr. Wolfe originally raised his claim of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction as 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel - i.e., that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R., pp.4-6.) However, the 
substance of his claims asserted the absence of subject matter jurisdiction given that 
his charged offense occurred on tribal grounds and the alleged victim was an Indian, 
thereby divesting the State court of jurisdiction. (R., pp.4-6.) 
Initially, the district court recognized the seriousness of Mr. Wolfe's claims and 
further recognized that his assertion of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction could 
well be valid, given that the alleged murder occurred within the Nez Perce Indian 
reservation. (R., pp.9-14.) After analyzing the controlling provisions of Idaho State and 
federal law governing the question, the district court concluded: 
Mr. Wolfe's argument that the State did not have jurisdiction to 
convict him of murder has merit under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Setting aside 
a conviction for first degree murder is serious business and should not be 
lightly undertaken. As a result, I want this issue to be fully briefed and 
argued before I make a decision. I, therefore, am going to require the 
State and request the l\lez Perce tribe to submit briefs on this issue. 
R., p.13 (emphasis added). 
However, the district court never ruled on the merits of Mr. Wolfe's claim of an 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction as alleged in his post-conviction petition. Well 
over one year later, the district court entered an order denying Mr. Wolfe's post-
conviction petition. (R., pp.375-394.) In the process of reviewing Mr. Wolfe's petition, 
the district court ordered and reviewed the military and medical records of the alleged 
victim in Mr. Wolfe's murder case in order to determine whether the victim was an 
Indian for purposes of determining whether the State of Idaho had jurisdiction. 
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(R., p.380.) These records indicated that the alleged victim would qualify as an Indian. 
(R., p.380.) 
Despite this, the district court did not dismiss Mr. Wolfe's petition for post-
conviction relief based upon an adjudication of the merits of Mr. Wolfe's claim. Instead, 
the court's sole rationale was that Mr. Wolfe's post-conviction petition was not timely 
filed and that none of the exceptions to the statute of limitations for post-conviction 
actions applied in Mr. Wolfe's case. (R., pp.383-394.) In fact, the district court's 
ultimate ruling on this petition was that interests in the finality of judgments trumped any 
claim of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 (R., pp.392-394.) Accordingly, the 
merits of Mr. Wolfe's subject matter jurisdiction claim remained undecided, despite 
numerous acknowledgements by the district court that the record indicated his 
arguments may be meritorious. 
Following the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, the district court likewise, 
and erroneously, denied his Rule 35 motion based upon the court's belief that the 
motion was untimely. (R., p.49.) Therefore, the district court once again failed to reach 
the merits of Mr. Wolfe's claim that there was no subject matter jurisdiction for the 
criminal proceedings in his case. 
Following the district court's erroneous determination that Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 
motion alleging an illegal sentence was untimely, Mr. Wolfe filed a prose motion asking 
the court to reconsider its denial. (R., p.50.) In a memorandum submitted in support of 
this motion, Mr. Wolfe specifically noted the district court erred in denying his motion as 
3 It does not appear from the record that Mr. Wolfe appealed from the district court's 
adverse decision in that post-conviction action. 
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untimely, given that a defendant can raise a claim of an illegal sentence at any time 
under Rule 35. (R., p.54.) 
Mr. Wolfe's pro se motion for reconsideration, filed within two weeks of the 
district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion, languished undecided with the court for over 
six years. (R., pp.50, 289.) After receiving no answer from the court, Mr. Wolfe then 
filed a motion asking for the district court to schedule a hearing on his motion for 
reconsideration. (R., p.289.) He also submitted a recent Idaho Supreme Court Opinion, 
State v. Lute, 4 to the trial court as support for his motion for reconsideration of the denial 
of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.290-297.) 
This motion, too, was dismissed by the district court. {R., pp.298-299.) 
However, this time the dismissal was based upon a different error by the trial court - the 
court denied Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration based upon the finding that his legal 
merits of his substantive claims had already and actually been decided by the district 
court in his post-conviction petition and Rule 35 motion: 
The Court fully addressed all issues raised by Mr. Wolfe in both his 
Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35 and his Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relied in its Memorandum Opinion of October 26, 2006. All of Mr. Wolfe's 
claims for relief were dismissed by the Court's Order of December 21, 
2006, including his claim that the State of Idaho lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Mr. Wolfe's request for a hearing on his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 
35 that he filed in December 2004 is DENIED on the grounds and for the 
reasons that he has already had a hearing on that Motion and it was 
Denied. 
(R., p.299 (emphasis added).) 
Still undaunted, Mr. Wolfe made yet another attempt at having his claim of a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction heard. Mr. Wolfe filed another pro se Rule 35 motion 
4 State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837 (2011 ). 
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alleging an illegal sentence. (R., pp.328-364.) He also attached numerous documents 
to his motion, including a map of the Nez Perce reservation that showed the town where 
the murder was alleged to have occurred is within this reservation, documents from a 
different criminal case - but occurring in the same town as Mr. Wolfe's charged offense 
- in which the prosecutor dismissed the charges based upon the absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction in Idaho State courts, documents showing the alleged victim in this 
case was an Indian for purposes of determining jurisdiction, and the Resolution entered 
into between the Nez Perce tribe and the State of Idaho governing which offenses may 
be tried in State courts if they occurred on tribal lands. (R., pp.328-364.) 
Once again, the district court dismissed Mr. Wolfe's motion without making any 
determination on the merits of his claim that his sentence was illegal due to the absence 
of subject matter jurisdiction. (R., p.365.) Tl1e district court did so based upon a third, 
and likewise erroneous, rationale: that, "[t]he petitioner is only permitted to file one (1) 
motion under ICR 35." (R., p.365.) As before, the court never considered the 
substantive merits of Mr. Wolfe's claim that his sentence was illegal because there was 
no subject matter jurisdiction for his charged offense. 
Mr. Wolfe timely appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion, as well as from the court's order 
denying his subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence.5 (R., p.300.) 
5 Mr. Wolfe filed his Notice of Appeal on June 9, 2011 - prior to the filing of his 
subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence on June 17, 2011. (R., pp.300, 
328.) However, the filing of a notice of appeal is deemed to subsume all final judgments 
or orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from, other than orders either 
granting probation or relinquishing jurisdiction following a period of retained jurisdiction. 
I.AR. 17(e)(1)(c); State v. Fortin 124 Idaho 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, the 
district court's subsequent denial of Mr. Wolfe's successive Rule 35 motion alleging an 
illegal sentence is properly before this Court in this appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration of his 
Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence, and when the district court denied 
Mr. Wolfe's subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion For Reconsideration Of His 
Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence, And When The District Court Denied 
Mr. Wolfe's Subsequent Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wolfe asserts that the district court erred both in denying his motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of his initial Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence 
due to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, and in denying his subsequent Rule 35 
motion alleging the same. The district court's denials were predicated upon an 
erroneous understanding of the legal standards attendant to a Rule 35 motion that 
alleges an illegal sentence - particularly where the illegality alleged is the absence of 
subject matter jurisdiction for the underlying criminal proceedings. 
Additionally, Mr. Wolfe asserts that the record in this case demonstrates the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction in Idaho state court for Mr. Wolfe's underlying 
conviction for murder. This offense was alleged to have occurred on the Nez Perce 
Reservation, which constitutes Indian country for purposes of determining jurisdiction. 
The Nez Perce tribe has specifically declined to grant consent to the State of Idaho to 
prosecute this offense when it occurs within tribal grounds and involves an Indian. 
Finally, the record shows that the victim in this case was an Indian for purposes of 
establishing federal jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Given 
this, the State of Idaho lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try or to convict Mr. Wolfe for 
murder in state court, as exclusive jurisdiction over this offense rested with the federal 
courts. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any 
time." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839 (2011 ). Both the question of whether a 
sentence is illegal and the question of whether the trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the proceedings are issues of law that this Court reviews de nova. Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion For 
Reconsideration Of The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal 
Sentence 
1. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion For 
Reconsideration Of The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion Because The 
District Court Erroneously Applied The Doctrine Of Res Judicata To 
Determine That It Would Not Adjudicate The Merits Of This Motion 
In denying Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his initial Rule 
35 motion, alleging an illegal sentence, the district court held that his challenge to 
subject matter jurisdiction "was fully addressed" both in his prior post-conviction 
proceedings and in the underlying Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.298-299.) In addition to 
being factually erroneous, this ruling was contrary to the legal standards attendant on 
the court's discretion, as principles of res judicata do not apply under Idaho law where 
the legal question at issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The doctrine of res judicata generally precludes relitigation of a matter previously 
adjudicated. See, e.g., Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618 (Ct. App. 1990). However, 
this rule "is premised upon entry of a valid and final judgment." Id. (emphasis added). 
Indisputably, a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is not valid. Lute, 
150 Idaho at 840. Additionally, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is so fundamental 
that the parties cannot consent to the assumption of such jurisdiction where it is lacking, 
or be estopped from asserting its absence. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 374 
9 
(Ct. App. 2008). In light of these principles, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the 
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to litigation of the issue of whether the trial court 
had jurisdiction over the matter. See Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 
403 (1996); Systems Associates, Inc. v. Motorola Communications and Electronics, 
Inc., 116 Idaho 615,617 (1989). 
The district court in this case denied Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of his Rule 35 motion - in which he alleged an illegal sentence due to the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction - on the basis of res judicata. This was legal 
error because res judicata does not apply to claims of an absence of subject matter 
jurisdiction. However, this ruling was also erroneous for another reason: the district 
court in both Mr. Wolfe's prior post-conviction and in his underlying Rule 35 motion 
never actually decided the substantive merits of his claim of an illegal sentence. 
The doctrine res judicata only applies to preclude further consideration of an 
issue if that issue was actually decided on the merits. See Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 
144 Idaho 119, 124 (2007). Even assuming that the doctrine of res judicata applies to 
issues of subject matter jurisdiction - which it does not - the doctrine would not apply in 
the first instance in this case because the district court never actually decided the 
merits of Mr. Wolfe's claim of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in his initial 
Rule 35 motion. See Point l(C)(3) infra. Accordingly, because Mr. Wolfe's underlying 
Rule 35 motion alleged that his sentence was illegal because of a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Wolfe's motion seeking 
reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion on the basis of res judicata. 
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2. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion For 
Reconsideration Of The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion Because The 
District Court, In Ruling On The Underlying Rule 35 Motion, Had Failed To 
Adjudicate The Merits Of Mr. Wolfe's Claim Based Upon The Erroneous 
Belief That This Motion Was Untimely 
Mr. Wolfe filed his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion 
partly on the basis that the district court erred when it found tl·1is motion to be untimely. 
(R., pp.49, 54-55.) Because Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 motion had alleged an illegal sentence 
due to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, and because such a motion can be 
filed at any time, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Wolfe's motion for 
reconsideration of the court's ruling. 
As has been noted, I.C.R. 35 allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at 
any time. Lute, 150 Idaho at 839. In fact, when the illegality alleged regarding a 
criminal sentence is one relating to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction for the 
underlying criminal charge, the trial court retains jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 35 
motion even after the underlying criminal sentence has been fully served by the 
defendant. Id. at 839-840. 
Here, the sole ground for the district court's denial of Mr. Wolfe's motion that 
alleged an illegal sentence was that the motion was "untimely." (R., pp.31-32, 49.) This 
ruling was error as a matter of law, as was pointed out by Mr. Wolfe. (R., pp.54-55.) 
Accordingly, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Wolfe's motion for 
reconsideration regarding that motion. 
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3. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Wolfe's Motion For 
Reconsideration Of His Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence 
Because The District Court Tendered Its Decision Based Upon An 
Incorrect Understanding Of The Record In This Case 
Mr. Wolfe also asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
reconsider the denial of his Rule 35 motion because the court did so in reliance on 
clearly erroneous findings of fact regarding the factual and procedural history in this 
case. 
This Court reviews a trial court's findings of fact for whether these findings are 
clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243 (2007). A factual 
finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Id. "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Fearn v. Steed, 151 Idaho 295, 298 (2011). 
In this case, the district court denied Mr. Wolfe's' motion for reconsideration 
based upon the court's erroneous belief that the court "fully addressed all issues 
raised by Mr. Wolf[e] in both his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35 and his Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief in its Memorandum Opinion of October 26, 2006." 
(R., pp.298-299.) This finding was not supported at all by the record in this case, and 
therefore was clearly erroneous. 
In Mr. Wolfe's post-conviction action, the district court appears to have 
acknowledged the merits of Mr. Wolfe's assertion that there was no subject matter 
jurisdiction for the criminal proceedings that culminated in his conviction for murder. 
(R., pp.13, 380, 392.) In fact, after noting that the city of Stites (where Mr. Wolfe's 
alleged offense occurred) was within the Nez Perce reservation, the district court found 
that, "[t]he evidence now available persuades me that there is a genuine issue of 
whether the court had had jurisdiction because there is credible admissible evidence 
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that [the alleged victim] was Native American." (R., p.392.) However, the district court 
ultimately concluded that the interests in the finality of Mr. Wolfe's conviction trumped 
the potential absence of subject matter jurisdiction in his case; and that his post-
conviction petition would therefore be deemed untimely. (R., pp.392-394.) Accordingly, 
the district court never addressed the substantive merits of Mr. Wolfe's claim of an 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather found that these claims were waived 
by not being timely asserted. 
Similarly, the district court did not reach the substantive merits of Mr. Wolfe's 
claim of an illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35 in light of the alleged absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction. (R., pp.31-32.) Instead, the district court erroneously ruled that his 
Rule 35 motion was untimely, despite the fact that I.C.R. 35 expressly provides that a 
motion alleging an illegal sentence may be raised at any time. (R., p.49.) Accordingly, 
the district court never adjudicated the substantive merits of Mr. Wolfe's claims of an 
illegal sentence brought under his Rule 35 motion filed in December, 2004. 
The record in this case conclusively demonstrates that the district court did not 
"fully address" the substantive issues raised by Mr. Wolfe in his post-conviction petition 
and his Rule 35 motion regarding the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, the district court's factual finding that this occurred - which formed the 
primary basis for the court's denial of Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration - was 
clearly erroneous. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Successive Rule 35 Motion 
Alleging An Illegal Sentence Because The District Court Erroneously Held That 
Only One Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence Is Permitted In A Case 
Tl1e district court additionally erred when it refused to entertain the merits of 
Mr. Wolfe's successive Rule 35 motion, alleging an illegal sentence due to the absence 
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of subject matter jurisdiction, based upon the court's conclusion that, "[t]he petitioner is 
only permitted to file one (1) motion under ICR 35." (R., p.365.) However, Mr. Wolfe's 
successive Rule 35 motion alleged that he had received an illegal sentence, and 
therefore his motion was permitted both under the express terms of I.C.R. 35 and under 
case law interpreting this rule as it relates to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
(See R., pp.328-329.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 does provide for one limitation as to the number of 
motions that may be filed under this Rule - that, "no defendant may file more than one 
motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule." I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis 
added). By the plain terms of this rule, this provision does not apply to claims of an 
illegal sentence brought pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a). I.C.R. 35(a). 
The fact that a successive motion alleging an illegal sentence is properly 
justiciable is further demonstrated by the Lute Opinion. In Lute, the defendant filed a 
second Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence well after the 
defendant had served his entire sentence, and claimed in this successive motion that 
~1is sentence was illegal due to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Lute, 150 
Idaho at 838-839. The Court in Lute did not find that the defendant's successive Rule 
35 motion was not permitted by the Idaho Criminal Rules. To the contrary, the Court 
found that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim of an illegal 
sentence despite the fact that a prior Rule 35 motion had been filed in that case -
"where a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a case - as it does here to 
consider Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion - and it is apparent that there is an issue concerning 
subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted of something that is not a 
crime, this Court must correct that error." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840 (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Wolfe's successive Rule 35 motion, alleging an illegal sentence based upon 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was properly before the district court. The trial court 
erred, as a matter of law, when the court failed to rule on the merits of Mr. Wolfe's Rule 
35 motion alleging an illegal sentence on the basis that Mr. Wolfe had previously filed 
an earlier Rule 35 motion. Accordingly, Mr. Wolfe submits that this Court should vacate 
the district court's order denying his successive Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal 
sentence. 
E. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Wolfe's Motion For Reconsideration And 
Subsequent Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence Because The Record In 
This Case Reveals That There Was No Subiect Matter Jurisdiction For The 
Criminal Charge And Subsequent Criminal Conviction For Murder In This Case 
Mr. Wolfe further asserts that the record in this case is sufficiently developed so 
as to establish that the trial court in his underlying criminal proceedings for murder was 
without subject matter jurisdiction to try Mr. Wolfe on this charge, or sentence him upon 
his conviction. Because the district court properly had jurisdiction to consider 
Mr. Wolfe's claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, this Court likewise 
has the authority to decide Mr. Wolfe's claims regarding subject matter jurisdiction. 
Therefore, because it is apparent that there was no subject matter jurisdiction in Idaho 
state court for the offense of murder as alleged in this case, Mr. Wolfe asks that this 
Court reverse the district court's orders denying his Rule 35 motions and remand this 
case to the district court with instructions to vacate his conviction. See Lute, 150 Idaho 
at 840-841. 
Mr. Wolfe's jurisdictional claim in this case involves the interplay of state and 
federal law with regard to certain criminal charges that occur within Indian country and 
that involve Indians in the commission of the offense: 
15 
Criminal jurisdiction over Indians is divided among federal, state, and tribal 
governments. A determination of whether one or more of these 
sovereigns possesses criminal jurisdiction in a particular instance depends 
upon the type of offense committed, where the offense was committed, 
and whether either the perpetrator or the victim is an Indian. 
State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 31 O ( 1999). 
The federal government, and Congress in particular, possesses plenary authority 
over Indian affairs, and this authority extends to crimes occurring on tribal lands. Id. at 
311. "As a corollary to federal sovereignty it is clear that state law has no force and 
effect, except as granted by federal law, within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters 
affecting Indians." Boyer v. Shoshone-Bannock Indian Tribes, 92 Idaho 257, 260 
(1968). "States have no jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country absent the clear 
consent of Congress." State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 416 (1986). Additionally, the 
Idaho State Constitution "expressly recognizes that the Indian lands within the 
boundaries of the state 'shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
congress of the United States."' State v. Allen, 100 Idaho 918, 922 (1980); IDAHO 
CONST. Art. 21, § 19. In light of this, the State bears the burden to establish jurisdiction 
over an Indian in Indian country, or to establish that the tribe has consented to the 
State's jurisdiction Major, 111 Idaho at 418. Additionally, this Court narrowly construes 
any statute purporting to extend state jurisdiction over Indian country. State v. Barros, 
131 Idaho 379, 382 (1998); State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 77, 81 (Ct. App. 2005). 
In the exercise of its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress enacted two 
primary provisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction over crimes occurring within 
Indian country. Id. First, Congress enacted the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152,6 
6 This statutory provision provides in pertinent part that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
by law, the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses 
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which extends federal jurisdiction and the application of federal criminal law over crimes 
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1152; U.S. v. 
LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2011); Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311. The second 
provision enacted by Congress regarding the commission of criminal offenses within 
Indian country is the Major Crimes Act, which provides exclusive federal jurisdiction 
over certain enumerated offenses when those crimes are committed by an Indian within 
Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153; LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311. 
The General Crimes Act is the federal provision at issue with regard to Mr. Wolfe's claim 
that Idaho state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his offense. 
For those offenses not governed by the Major Crimes Act, Congress further 
enacted Public Law 280, which permitted the states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction 
over Indian affairs through legislative action. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311. Pursuant to 
this law, the State of Idaho enacted I.C. § 67-5101, which set out certain areas upon 
which the State assumed and accepted jurisdiction for both civil and criminal 
enforcement of state law. I.C. § 67-5101; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311. As was noted by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Mathews, the State of Idaho did not assume jurisdiction 
over the offense of murder within I.C. § 67-5101. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311. 
Public Law 280 was subsequently replaced by 25 U.S.C. § 1321, which permitted 
the states to assume additional jurisdiction over criminal matters occurring within Indian 
country that are committed by or against Indians, but only with the consent of the 
particular Indian tribe occupying that territory. 25 U.S.C. § 1321; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 
311. Similarly, Idaho also adopted I.C. § 67-5102, which likewise provided tribal 
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, 
except the District of Columbia, shall extend to Indian country." See 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
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consent for the assumption of additional state jurisdiction for criminal or civil causes of 
action arising out of Indian country. I.C. § 67-5102; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311; Major, 
111 Idaho at 417. Accordingly, while the State of Idaho may assume additional 
jurisdiction over offenses that would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the federal 
court under the General Crimes Act, it can only do so through a resolution adopted by 
the tribal governing body in which the tribe consents to that jurisdiction. LC. § 67-5101. 
The crime for which Mr. Wolfe was charged and convicted was not one for which 
the Nez Perce tribe had consented to concurrent state jurisdiction. (R., pp.344-345.) 
The Resolution entered into between the Nez Perce tribe and the State of Idaho does 
not provide for the assumption of any jurisdiction of the State of Idaho for the offense of 
murder in any degree. (R., pp.344-345.) In fact, the Resolution specifically provides 
that the State of Idaho does not have any jurisdiction to try such an offense occurring 
within Nez Perce tribal lands: 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the offenses listed in Section 1153, 
Title 18 United States Code, commonly known as the ten major crimes, 
i.e. murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault 
with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny; and also 
embezzlement or theft of funds or property of an Indian tribal organization 
as provided by Federal law, shall remain under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Government until such time as the Nez Perce Tribal Executive 
Committee shall enact an appropriate resolution expressing the desire of 
the people of the Nez Perce Reservation that the State of Idaho accept 
additional jurisdiction of such crimes, ... 
R., p.345 (emphasis added); see also Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311-312 (noting that the 
resolution between the Nez Perce tribe and the State of Idaho expressly did not provide 
consent for additional jurisdiction in the state courts for the offense of murder). 
Regarding whether the alleged offense in this case occurred within Indian 
country for purposes of federal jurisdiction, there appears to be no material dispute on 
this issue. The charged offense occurred within the city of Stites, which is within the 
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boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. (Confidential Exhibit P. 7) The Nez Perce 
Reservation has already been deemed by the Idaho Supreme Court to be "Indian 
country" for purposes of determining whether the state or federal court has jurisdiction 
over a charged offense pursuant to both the General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes 
Act. See Major, 111 Idaho 410,413 n.2 (1986); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1502, 1503; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 1151. Accordingly, the record reflects that Mr. Wolfe's charged offense was 
one that occurred within Indian country, and was an offense for which the Nez Perce 
tribe had not consented to Idaho State jurisdiction. 
The remaining issue regarding whether there was subject matter jurisdiction in 
Idaho state court for the charges against Mr. Wolfe turns upon whether the alleged 
victim in this case qualified as an "Indian," as that term is used in the General Crimes 
Act. Neither the General Crimes Act, nor the Major Crimes Act, defines the term 
"Indian" as used in these statutes. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877. However, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has developed a two-part test for determining whether either the victim 
or the defendant qualifies as an "Indian" for purposes of these statutes that is instructive 
for this Court. First, the individual in question must possess a "sufficient 'degree of 
Indian blood."' LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877 (quoting U.S. v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-
1224 (9th Cir. 2005)). Second, that individual must also have "tribal or federal 
7 Mr. Wolfe acknowledges that the map of the Nez Perce Reservation, showing where 
Stites is located within the reservation, is hard to discern. However, this Court may also 
take judicial notice of the fact that the town of Stites is located within the Nez Perce 
Reservation. See I.C. 9-101 (8) (courts may take judicial notice of, inter alia, "the 
geographical divisions and political history of the world. In all these cases the court may 
resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference."); 
http://www.nezperce.org/Rezlnfo/NPreservation.htm (listing Stites as a city contained 
within the Nez Perce Reservation) (website last visited 5/9/12). 
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government recognition as an Indian." Id. This test appears to have been adopted by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882, 885 (2002). 
The requirement that the individual possess a sufficient degree of "Indian blood" 
does not require a showing that the person in question has a majority Native American 
ethnic heritage. In fact, federal courts have found that this requirement is met by 
evidence that the person had 1/8 or 5/32 Indian blood. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877, Bruce, 
394 F.3d at 1223-1226. Here, the evidence shows that the alleged victim had at least 
3/8 Indian blood. (R., p.334.) Mr. Wolfe asserts that this evidence demonstrates that 
the first prong of the Bruce test has been met. 
The question of whether there is governmental or tribal recognition of the 
individual's status as a tribal member is more factually intensive. There are four general 
factors that have been employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in resolving this 
question, although these factors are non-exclusive. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877. In order of 
importance, these factors are: (1) whether the individual has enrolled as a tribal 
member; (2) government recognition, either formally or informally, through receipt of 
assistance reserved only to Indians; (3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 
(4) social recognition as an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation 
in Indian social life. Id.; see also Lewis, 137 Idaho at 885. 
As to the first, and most significant, consideration, the record in this case shows 
that the alleged victim was officially enrolled and registered with the Blackfeet Indian 
Nation.8 (R., p.334.) Not only did the alleged victim have an assigned enrollment 
8 The Blackfeet Indian Tribe is a federally recognized tribe for purposes of determining 
subject matter jurisdiction under both the Major Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act. 
See U.S. v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080-1081 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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number, but the documentation submitted to the district court shows that he was "listed 
on the official records" of the tribe. (R., pp.334.) 
The second and third considerations of whether there was government 
recognition of a person's status as an Indian in light of assistance reserved for Indians, 
and whether the person enjoyed the benefits of tribal affiliation, also appear to be met in 
light of the record in this case. Among the confidential exhibits provided to the district 
court was evidence of medical treatment that the alleged victim received at Nimiipuu 
Health Center. (Confidential Exhibit M, Augment. 9) The district court noted that these 
records came from the Nez Perce Tribal Medical Facilities.10 (R., p.380.) This form 
indicates that the alleged victim was ethnically an Indian, and that he had 1/2 Indian 
blood within the Blackfeet Indian tribe. (Confidential Exhibit M, Augment.) This 
evidence is consistent with the district court's findings as to the alleged victim's status 
as an Indian. (R., p.380.) 
The Ninth Circuit in LaBuff has held that the receipt of medical services intended 
for tribal members and other non-member Indians is sufficient to establish the second 
and third factors regarding recognized status as a tribal member. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 
878. Accordingly, Mr. Wolfe asserts that the evidence of the alleged victim's receipt of 
medical services through the Nimiipuu Health Center, and the indications on the 
documents from this center of his status as an Indian, demonstrates both government 
9 The confidential exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Brit Groom were augmented into 
the record on appeal pursuant to Mr. Wolfe's motion to augment, which was granted by 
the Idaho Supreme Court through its Order Granting Motion to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Motion to Unseal Documentary Exhibits and Affidavit in Support Thereof, 
which was entered by the Court on April 30, 2012. 
10 This Court may wish to note that Nimiipuu Health Center is a Nez Perce tribal entity. 
See http://www.nimiipuuhealth .orgl (website last visited 5/9/12). 
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recognition of the victim's status as an Indian through the receipt of services reserved 
for Indians and that the alleged victim received benefits as a result of his tribal affiliation. 
The last of the non-exclusive factors employed by the Ninth Circuit is whether 
there is evidence of social recognition as an Indian through residence on a reservation 
and participation in Indian social life. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877. The medical records of 
the victim in Mr. Wolfe's case reflect that, at least at the time these records were 
generated, the victim listed his residence as being in Stites, Idaho. (Confidential 
Exhibits B, E, F.) As has been noted, the town of Stites in located within the Nez Perce 
Reservation. Thus, there is at least some indication within the record that the alleged 
victim had long-term connections with the Nez Perce reservation, as he had listed a 
town within the reservation as his home address on the military documents provided to 
the district court. 
The evidence already contained within the record demonstrates that the alleged 
victim was an Indian for purposes of determining subject matter jurisdiction under the 
General Crimes Act. Because Mr. Wolfe's offense involved an Indian victim, occurred 
within Indian country, and was an offense for which the Nez Perce tribe had not 
provided for Idaho state jurisdiction, there was no subject matter jurisdiction for his 
murder charge and conviction within Idaho courts. Accordingly, Mr. Wolfe asks that this 
Court reverse the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motions, and remand his case to 
the district court with instructions to vacate Mr. Wolfe's conviction. See Lute, 150 Idaho 
at 841. Alternatively, if this Court believes that additional evidence within the record is 
necessary to determine the jurisdictional issue, Mr. Wolfe respectfully requests that this 
Court remand his case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. See 
Major, 111 Idaho at 120-121. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence for murder because the State of Idaho lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over this charge. In the alternative, Mr. Wolfe asks that this Court reverse the district 
court orders denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion, 
as well as the denial of his subsequent Rule 35 motion, and remand this case for a 
hearing on the merits of these motions. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2012. 
SARAH E. TOMPKIN ,_, 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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